Non-Conceptual Aspects of Experience

Edited by: Hallvard Fossheim, Tarjei Mandt Larsen and John Richard Sageng

Perceptual experience is often conceived as a a foundation for human knowledge. Many philosophers hold that experience can serve this role only because it has certain non-conceptual aspects. This view raises problems that have taken many forms throughout the history of philosophy. Given hat human knowledge is conceptual, how can the non-conceptual aspects of experience be of relevance to it? And if they cannot, how can experience be a foundation for knowledge?


McDowell and the Openness of Experience
Tarjei Mandt Larsen

Seeing, Certainty and Apprehension
Kevin Mullgian

Discursive and Non-Discursive Thought
Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson

Perceptual Intimacy and Conceptual Inadequacy
Frode Kjosavik

The Indexicality of Perception and Perceptual Objects
Johan Arnt Myrstad

Non-Conceptual Meaning in Music
Arild Pedersen

Davidson and the Role of Error
Mariann Solberg

Perception and the Origin of Conceptual Content
John Richard Sageng

Causality and Cognition: Aristotele on the Material Basis for Conscious Perception
Hallvard Fossheim

Unipub forlag. Order here.

STOLEN TENT Philosophy Series